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Abstract 
 
The actual economic paradigm is based on a strongly cooperative model that tries to support a 
more competitive and global organizations response. With cooperation comes an intrinsic need - 
interconnection and interoperability of information systems among business partners. This 
represents, in many areas, a huge organizational challenge, being the field of information, and 
communication security one emerging key issue and a natural enabler for cooperative behavior 
and to the proper establishment and support of trust among network partners. Security 
frameworks, that can be able to describe and act on the basis of interoperability, cooperation and 
proactivity, became essential to support the new needs of modern business models. This paper 
present a framework that aims to contribute to a sustainable organizational information 
security-processes support, based on the ability to describe the allowed business process 
interactions among cooperative partners; furthermore, the framework presents a cooperative 
security perspective among partners basis on the idea that, if organizations have business 
cooperation, they should also have active security cooperation and regulation. If organizations, 
that need to cooperate, do not feel secure when they interconnect their information systems, the 
all cooperative perspective can fall down. Trust being one basic need for cooperation, impulse 
the need of a new security approach for cooperative scenarios.  
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Introduction  
 
Modern business paradigms are built on the 
established perspective that organization 
can’t be isolated environments but they 
must be strongly cooperative environments. 
Being organizations “cooperative islands”, 
and having them business processes 
supported by information processes, 
inevitability emerges the need for 
interoperability on their Information 
System (IS), in order to have information 
interchange and, in a more mature vision, 
the generation of knowledge obtained from 
the intersection of information and skills of 
all links in the cooperative network, that in 
a pure cooperation perspective must 
converge to a common goal or at least in a 
symbiotic  relationship. 
 
Among the set of challenges that exists in 
organizations cooperation, we focus on the 
security.  
 
Our approach is based on the principle that 
organizations can and should maintain their 
individuality in what concerns to their 
internal security policies but at the same 
time must have a secure support to business 
interoperability, and a cooperative vision of 
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security as a principle of cooperation. 
Interconnect IS cannot translate on the 
weakening of individual security, nor result 
in a cooperative network that, needing to 
interoperability their IS, neglect the 
individual security and/or materializes an 
insecure cooperative network. In our 
opinion it is necessary to rethink the 
security models in order to support such 
business models and we think that business 
networking don’t should stop on business 
cooperation, but should necessary have a 
security cooperative layer when 
cooperative network is build. 
 
The Business Perspective  
 
Organizations are seeking today, so 
incessant and increasingly desperate, new 
business models, suitable to the paradigm of 
Digital Economy (Österle et al., 2001). In 
this search, the concept of relationship 
amounts to becoming crucial to the success 
of organizations (Tapscott, 2002). In order 
to achieve these relationships organizations 
have been pursuing the establishment of 
partnerships, upstream and downstream of 
theirs core business and embarked on 
mergers and/or acquisitions. This drive is 
an embodiment of the networking 
capability, which boils down to the ability 
that organizations must establish 
mechanisms for cooperation with other 
organizations, through rapid and efficient 
bundling of business, supported by 
technology platforms (Österle et al., 2001). 
There are many reasons for inter-
organizational cooperation, there are many 
prominent examples: the pharmaceutical 
industry in the development of 
collaborative R&D projects or open source 
community, in the development of software 
systems (Buxman and König, 2000).  
 
The perspective of networking, envisions a 
model able to withstand the challenges of 
cooperation networks, being the timely-
concept of cooperation networks a more 
static or more dynamic interrelationship. 
Particularly the dynamic perspective of 
cooperation, where the cooperative 
network is rapidly changing by the in/out 
partners movements, will incur in 
additional complexity of IS security models, 
and will demand a more exigent and 
efficient management.  
 
The Information System Perspective 
 
Today and tomorrow, urges consider new 
ways and structures for business; to be 
based on our ability to re-think IS and 
believes that the information is the 
foundation of business success (Edwards et 
al., 1991). Based on this perspective, 
organizations spend a significant part of 
their time/capabilities in creating IS that 
can materialize competitive advantage for 
their business.  
 
Companies around the world are gradually 
and consistently, to be more interconnected 
(Davenport, 2000). According to a 
perspective of business networking, the 
requirements in terms of IS are significantly 
increased if compared to the models of the 
organizations working in isolation. This 
implies that if organizations leave a more 
surround-closed definition of business and 
starts to be open systems capable of 
supporting interoperability with other 
organizations. The vision of individual 
tradition security will fall, and will emerge a 
more unified security perspective.   
 
We are interested in IS highly integrated, 
and environments of strong cooperation. 
Such environments have constant exchange 
of information among cooperating IS, and 
multiple shared accesses to databases of 
information in order to support and 
facilitate the business processes across the 
network. Particularly we refer to the change 
of perspective in the generation of 
knowledge - now only possible thanks to 
the interoperability and information 
sharing of all IS.  
 
Although this view of IS evoke multiple 
areas of research are particularly interested 
in the security field. We are aware that a 
cooperative environment is particularly 
adverse to the implementation of security 
models effective-capable.  
 
An Agent-Based Security Framework  
 
This chapter explains the framework vision 
and present is components, trying to focus 
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on the role and contribute of each one for 
the implementation of a security 
cooperative approach.  
 
Framework Perspective 
 
Cooperative security architecture should 
protect the specificity of each organization 
but without compromising the necessary 
interoperability. This principle stems from 
the requirement that each organization is 
free to establish their internal security 
policies. 
  
An interconnection among IS necessarily 
lead to a greater potential fragility of 
individual IS, as it requires extending the 
access permissions to resources that were 
previously inaccessible to the external 
context. But the interconnection of IS is 
necessary for support cooperation.  
 
For the basic principles that should govern 
the planning of the security architecture 
should reflect these (Bishop, 2003):  
 
• Minimum privileges: an organization IS 
shall have only the privileges absolutely 
necessary to complete their tasks.  
 
• Fault / Denial default: unless a given 
object have been given at the time of its 
creation, explicit access permissions, it 
should be denied is access.  
 
• Access control: there should be a 
mediation in order to determine 
whether a given entity that requests the 
use of a privilege or may not enjoy the 
same.  
 
•  Open architecture: the robustness of the 
architecture should not only reside in 
the aspects of secrecy of its construction.  
 
•  Psychologically accepted: the security 
architecture should not be an obstacle to 
usability and interoperability of IS and 
an obstacle to the normal work of the 
organizational internal collaborators.  
All access to the resources of each 
organization can only be reached in one of 
two ways: either it is a programmed access 
that will be accepted, or is "request for 
access" that is not scheduled and that will 
be subject to evaluation according to the 
rules pre-established (or if they are missing 
through human decision).  
 
The security architecture should monitor all 
access in order to detect abnormal patterns 
of behavior and possibly trigger alarms 
and/or take safeguard measures to keep the 
network safe. It is also have complementary 
action by automatically inform all partners 
about the abnormality and measures taken 
(if this is the procedure expressed by the 
predefined rules), thereby ensuring that 
each of the IS of the cooperation network 
can implement their individuals measures 
in accordance with their rules, fostering a 
desirable group reaction.  
 
The prospect of security should always be 
cooperative (preserving the individuality of 
each partner), in the sense that the security 
systems of each partner should share 
information with each others, leading to 
increased the security of the group.  
 
The Proposal Framework Architecture 
 
To operationalize these principles of 
architecture proposes a model that we hope 
to demonstrate, by implementing a 
prototype to be able to implement a 
consistent security policy based on rules 
and whose skills fit the access control and 
intrusion detection and cooperation. This 
architecture should be able to detect 
abnormal behavior that departs resources 
business partners of the cooperation 
network to mirror the relationship of trust 
between business partners. The Figure 1 
presented our Framework Architecture that 
is after explained, in a components-
contribution approach. 
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Fig 1. Framework Architecture: An Example for Two Cooperating Organizations 
 
Framework Components  
 
Intrusion Detection System (IDS): 
Resource able to detect patterns of attacks 
(e.g. DoS) from the observation of abnormal 
behavior and inconsistent with existing 
security policies (Denning, 1987). IDS are 
particularly important for detecting internet 
patens attacks, but it lack in mostly on 
recognizing traffic that seems innocuous but 
hasn’t an organization logical context (and 
in this case is suspicious). This is also a 
common approach focuses on the belief that 
the potential threat is outside the 
organization and not inside. Defense against 
internal attacks is typically neglected 
(Dayarathna, 2009)    
 
Firewall: Entity responsible for mediating 
access to the network, allowing or denying 
certain types of access on a given security 
policy (Bishop, 2003). This is a helpfully 
framework-component and it is the 
typically way of blocking traffic, based in 
rules that, as the IDS cannot easily describe 
the business workflow perspective.   
 
Knowledge Data Base (KDB): This 
component has a description that translates 
the organizational cooperation rules, based 
in a business perspective and bridging the 
gap between business security rule and 
security technical rules. This will be the 
repository where will be described how 
each agent should assess and decide the  
action to the situations they encounter. This 
entity must translate the adaptive relations 
of trust among network partners.  
 
It should be noted that this KDB should 
describe the behavior and Interoperation 
accepted as normal among business 
partners contributing to the blockage of the 
inadvertent and inappropriate actions that 
depart from elements of the same network 
or from cooperative partners. It is a key 
element of the security architecture for its 
ability to describe the very model of 
cooperation and interoperability. 
  
Internal Security Sensor (IS Sensor): 
Although some of the described 
technologies, such as IDS, whose detection 
engine and approach can be very diversified 
(Teodoro et al., 2009) can be used to oppose 
to domestic attacks and also to better 
understand the behavior of their users, 
looking how these technologies are used in 
organizations allows us to verify that there 
is a clear tendency to use them only as a 
shield against attacks from outside. In this 
context IS sensor is a component that 
should translate the internal attack point-
of-view and should result as an internal IDS 
component. Controlling the internal users is 
particularly important on cooperative 
scenarios, because internal collaborators 
can have a privileged access to resources of 
cooperative partners, and their actions 
should be controlled.  
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Agent: This component is responsible for, 
after consulting its Knowledge Database 
(KDB), act to safeguard organizational 
interests by cooperating with the IDS and 
the FW. The agent should be responsible for 
granting or denying requests for access to 
resources on your network. It should also, 
after consultation with the KDB, decide the 
reconfiguration of the FW and IDS, notify 
the system administrator and / or other 
agents of the organizations of the 
cooperation network (where they will act in 
accordance with their KDB) to redefine the 
policies established. This must be proactive 
by its ability to predict and report before 
things go wrong.  
 
Administrator: Receive alerts and manage 
the agent. He is the maximum responsible in 
the working-maturity of the agent enabling 
that the agent reflects the correct security 
policy that the organization wants to apply. 
 
Organization Information System (OIS): 
This framework component represents the 
organizational information system, which 
only can be reached through the Agent.  
 
Framework Implementation: One 
Overview of Our Work in Progress 
 
The proposal framework architecture 
implementation is currently being study. 
Interoperability is a very hard task because 
organization IS typically grows up in an 
unique way and their security structures 
also: they face the IS heterogeneity 
problems. So, when organizations need to 
cooperate, they face the problem of 
interconnect and full interoperate their 
systems.  
 
Fortunately, in the last year, the Service 
Orientated Architectures (SOA) has 
contributed to bridge the gap between 
interoperability problems. Currently an 
architecture based on services using web 
services is one of the best options in use to 
promote interoperability among 
heterogeneous information systems (Liu et 
al, 2009).   
 
Web services are considered as a mean to 
improve interoperability among 
heterogeneous applications, in several 
domain organizations. For instance, they are 
commonly accepted and increasingly used 
approach to m-commerce, as stated in 
(Chen et. al., 2007; Kim et. al., 2006) or in 
health systems, where web services are 
used to promote interoperability among 
heterogeneous information systems 
(Serbanati et al, 2011). 
 
We think that SOA approach should be the 
mainstream of the framework architecture 
implementation, in what concerns to the 
support of the interoperability among the 
different agents, and how they can 
communicate among themselves.  
 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is also one other 
key issue to implement the proposal 
architecture. AI is needed to insure that the 
agent can be able to decide correctly in all 
different kinds of requests, being also 
capable of learning with his 
decisions/results and the decisions of the 
Administrator.   
 
Execution Primitives represent the agent-
component capable of interact with the 
security components of the organization 
(e.g. IDS, Firewall). This component should 
be, typically, one organization-unique 
implementation, because it must match 
with the specificity of the security 
components of each organization.  
 
The Agent component referred in the Figure 
1, can be represented, in a more detailed 
implementation perspective, in Figure 2, 
where he show the role of SOA and AI in the 
functioning of the Agent. 
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Fig 2. Agent Component 
 
Conclusion and Final Remarks  
 
This paper, presents a security framework 
for cooperative scenarios, based on an 
agent-based security framework. It is also 
focus on the maintenance of individual 
organizational security policies control. It 
contributes for a better description of 
security rules, policies and actions in a 
business cooperative perspective and not 
on a security-only view. This framework 
also works on a full cooperation perspective 
for security cooperation that should exist 
among partners of a cooperative network. 
Implementation of the presented 
architecture is also discussed and there are 
pointed solutions for prototype this 
framework. We believe that only with 
strong and reliable security architectures 
organizations can face the problems and 
challenges of a more and more networked 
vision of an organization. This paper is a 
contribution for business cooperative 
scenarios, and especially for the 
implementation a cooperative perspective 
of security among organizations.  
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